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gives prima facie plausibility to established social practices. In cases of
massive and persistent conflict between two such practices, Alston proposes that we give preference to the one that is more firmly established.
Brown argues that in the case of religious belief systems, we can fall into
a relativistic bog in attempting to determine which is more establishede.g., which is more compatible with the contemporary scientific enterprise. Unfortunately, this leads Brown to focus on the plausibility of the
miracle stories in Christianity compared with those in an imagined rival
religion. It may be that there is not much to choose from if we take such
claims in isolation and ask which is the more "bizarre." But that project
distracts us from Alston's larger insight that we might judge which practices are established by looking at historical and other evidence, including their fit with other things we already believe, the cultural institutions
and practices they have given rise to, and so on.

Religious Experience and Religious Belief. George Wall. Lanham, New
York, and London: University Press of America, 1995. Pp. vii and 340.
$51.50 cloth, $39.50 paper.
J. KELLENBERGER, California State University, Northridge.
There are, some say, two kinds of people in the world: those who like
noise and those who do not, or those who chew gum and those who do
not. In the same vein, we might observe, there are two kinds of religious
philosophers: those who ground their philosophical reflections in religious sensibility (some strain of religious sensibility) and proceed to
philosophical issues concerning religion, and those who ground their
philosophical reflections in philosophical theory and proceed to philosophical issues concerning religion. My dichotomous comment is on
religious philosophers, religious philosophers of religion, not on all
philosophers of religion. That is, my comment is on philosophers of religion who have religious sensibilities and, being religious, have some
sympathy for religion. Though they all have religious sensibilities, not
all start with those sensibilities in their philosophical reflections. Some
do, but some start with philosophical theory.
George Wall starts with theory. Early on (p. 12) he states his acceptance of the innocent-until-proven-guilty or reliable-until-defeated epistemology of William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne.
But at the same time Wall, via an appreciation of the approach of
William James, draws deeply upon religious phenomena. In this respect
he is unlike most analytic philosophers. Like James's Varieties, Wall's
book contains a collection of actual reported cases of religious experience. Most of Wall's cases, he tells us, were obtained from the Alister
Hardy Research Centre in Oxford, England, but many he has gathered
himself through personal interviews. Although Wall is not presenting
the cases he considers for their own sake, but rather to argue for his pri-
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mary thesis, the panoply of cases he gives us with an unstinting richness
of detail provides a phenomenological dimension to his book.
Wall's main objective is to "consider some proposed general objections to ([that is, some] proposed general defeaters of) religious experience as prima facie justification for religious belief" (p. 31). His effort is to
show that these proposed defeaters, which often take the form of naturalistic explanations of religious experience, do not stand up as general
defeaters of religious experience as such. The first naturalistic defeater
he considers is background religious teaching. Wall distinguishes three
separable theses involved in the claim that religious background
accounts for religious experience and so defeats it as justification for
belief: (1) Thesis C, that the content of religious experience, what one
perceives God to be, is explicitly present in one's previous religious
teaching; (2) Thesis 0, that a necessary condition for one's having a religious experience is one's having been taught that religious experience of
that sort is valuable; and (3) Thesis P, that a necessary condition for
one's having a religious experience is one's having a positive attitude
toward religion. By appealing to an array of actual occurrences of religious experiences, Wall is able to present counterexamples to each of
these three theses and so to argue that religious backgound does not
stand up as a general defeater.
He goes on to argue similarly - via counterexamples - against other
proposed naturalistic defeaters: conscious desire and unconscious desire
and motivation. In addition he considers and argues against several
proposed defeaters that do not fall under the heading of naturalistic
explanations of religious experience. One such is embodied in the claim
that religious experience does not have the effect it should if it were an
encounter with the Divine. Again Wall presents concrete cases from
which he concludes that while people respond in a variety of ways to
religious experience, in the majority of these representative cases there
were positive immediate or long-term effects (e.g., joy, peace, and
increased sensitivity to others). Another proposed defeater is that there
is no "overrider system" regarding religious experience: that is, religious
experience is defeated generally as justification for religious belief
because there are no specific defeaters of religious experience - no criteria for genuine religious experience. But, Wall argues, there are such criteria (e.g., consistency with authoritative teaching, and doxastic moral
practice), and, he argues, these are not criteria for Christian Doxastic
Practice (CMP) alone, but for Universal Religious Doxastic Practice
(URP).
The last proposed defeater that he considers is that if there is URP
then we will end up with conflicting religious beliefs justified on the
basis of religious experiences that will qualify as genuine religious experiences. Wall considers two conflicts: the first is over whether God, or
Ultimate Reality, is personal or impersonal, and the second is over the
superiority of a particular religion over other religions. Regarding the
first, he argues that religious experiences of God as essentially personal
or impersonal are rare, and as long as such cases are limited, even
though they are irresolvable, they no more constitute a general defeater
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of religious experience than irresolvable conflicts in reports of sense perception contitute a general defeater of sense experience as justification
for belief. Regarding the second, he argues that it is rare for religious
experience to give rise to claims to religious superiority, and, in any case,
such a conflict may be resolvable.
There is much in the details of Wall's discussion and argument that
invites criticism or praise, but I shall limit myself to a few general comments.
I think that Wall may be underestimating the sublety of the unconscious and the ways it can precipitate belief and experience and can
color experience. He argues that "we should not suppose unconscious
desire for God to be different from conscious desire, unless we have specific evidence to the contrary" (p. 97). But proponents of the view that
religious belief is created by unconscious desires, like Nietzsche and others, believe there is an abundance of such evidence. Wall asks why, if
there is an unconscious desire for forgiveness, the unconscious would
not be more direct in conveying a sense of forgiveness - why would it
bother to project a sense of the Presence of God? Why indeed! To borrow and redirect some lines of Emerson's: "They reckon ill who leave
me out" - "They know not well the subtle ways / I keep, and pass, and
turn again." It is Brahman speaking in Emerson's poem, but we may
pay the same courtesy to the unconscious. If unconscious desire is
working behind the scenes to produce the kinds of religious experiences
Wall considers, or just the sense of God's presence, it may well be
shrouded in self-deception - a category that Wall does not really deal
with. And the same thing can be said for a desire that there not be a
God. It is perhaps because Wall starts with a theory of justification for
religious belief that is analogous to a theory of justification for perceptual beliefs that he, at one point, looks for defeaters of religious experience
that are analogous to specific defeaters of sensory perception. With a
different stating point he might have given more importance to selfdecption and its hidden, unconscious motivation.
Nevertheless, within the domain of its working space, Wall's book is
effective. It is a strength of Wall's book that he considers in detail a
number of actual cases of religious experience, and, as well, the background of the subject and the expectations, hopes, and beliefs of the subject before the experience, and, sometimes, the subsequent change or
lack of change in the subjects's life. This makes his treatment noteworthy and valuable if for no other reason than that it provides some useful
data for philosophical reflection. I say "useful" for I think that Wall, like
James, is right that reflection on actual cases of religious experience
should not be an embarrassment to philosophical reflection on the character of, or the epistemological credentials of, religious experience. It is
on the basis of the concrete cases he presents that he is able to argue
against Theses C, 0, and P.
In addition, drawing upon these concrete cases, Wall can substantiate
futher points of religious and philosophical significance about the character of religious experience. For instance, he is able to show that, as a
matter of fact, religious experience of different sorts can occur in a par-
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ticular culture. He presents experiences of several subjects who stand in
the Western theistic - specifically Christian - tradition, who nevertheless had experinces of the Divine in a more Eastern impersonal form,
and he presents some cases of subjects who had experiences of the
Divine as personal and at other times as impersonal. Pretty clearly, as
Wall appreciates, these phenomena have implications for the kind of
view of religious experience that Steven Katz has defended (not that
Wall argues Katz is altogether wrong).
Wall's book is the fruit of both reflection and collection, and is personal in the sense that all sensitive philosophical treatments of religious
phenomena are personal (in Wall's case he cites as one among many his
own religious experience). Despite the lack of an index, this book makes
a nice contribution to the literature on religious experience and belief.

At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol
Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II. Kenneth L. Schmitz. Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1994. Pp. x and 170. $24.95 (Cloth), $11.95
(Paper).
PATRICIA SAYRE, Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana
Whatever one might think of the policies and pronouncements of Karol
Wojtyla, Pope John Paul II, there can be no doubt that he is an important
public figure and an extraordinary individual. The most traveled pope
in the history of the church, his gifts as a linguist have enabled him to
communicate directly with an astonishing range of audiences in a wide
variety of native tongues. At the same time as he has cultivated a global
presence, his deep commitment to his own homeland has drawn him
into secular politics at a crucial moment in Polish history, making him a
key player in the dismantling of communism in Eastern Europe. In addition, Wojtyla is a man of letters whose output as a writer has been enormous. His recent book, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, has become an
international best seller, and his encyclicals have sparked passionate
debate both within the church and without. Many of his most controversial teachings have to do with issues of personal and specifically sexual
morality, but, as he made clear in his most recent encyclical,
"Evangelium Vitae," these teachings are not isolated policy statements
but flow from an overarching vision of a "culture of life" that is the
church's alternative to what he describes as the currently prevailing
"culture of death."
Kenneth L. Schmitz, in At the Center of the Human Drama: The
Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II, is more interested in tracing the origins of the philosophical vision underlying
Wojtyla's papal teachings than he is with controversial aspects of the
teachings themselves. At the heart of his book is a carefully considered
interpretation of The Acting Person, a text Schmitz takes to be the most

